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ABSTRACT
This paper models an economy in which it is costly to move
resources between the tradeable and nontradeable sectors.The
economy is subject to capital flowsthat are unpredictable and are
perceived as having only limited persistence. Themodel shows that
both the fact that capital flows are perceived as temporaryand
uncertainty per se act to limit the responsivesnessof resource
reallocation to real exchange rate movements. In turn,this
reluctance of factors to move widens the range of real exchange
rate variation, so that larger movements of thereal exchange rate
are needed to accommodate transitory, unpredictable capitalflows
than would be required to accommodate persistent, predictable
flows of the same magnitude. The model also shows that large
capital inflows that lead to real exchange rate appreciationlarge
enough to induce resource reallocation will typicallybe followed





Cambridge, MA 02138Changes in a country's trade balance generally involve not
only substitution in demand between domestic and foreign goods,
but also reallocation of resources between tradeable and
nontradeable sectors. Since resource reallocation is not costless,
this means that the process of adjustment to a changed capital
flow involves investment decisions at the micro level -- whichin
turn suggests that the dynamics of trade balance adjustment will
involve expectations as well as current values of economic
variables, and that uncertainty will affect the pace and character
of the adjustment process. The dynamics of trade balance
adjustment, in turn, must have a bearing on the behavior of
exchange rates. So it is important to attempt to model just how it
is that resources get reallocated when trade balances do change.
This issue has become particularly relevant now. The massive
capital inflows to the US in the l980s had as their counterpart a
considerable reallocation of resources out of US tradeable
sectors, with employment and capacity falling sharply in many
export and import-competing industries. This "deindustrialization"
in the US had as its counterpart a corresponding growth of
capacity abroad. With a decline in the willingness of foreigners
to continue to supply capital to the US, there has been a sharp
decline in the real exchange rate -- buta disappointingly
sluggish reduction in the US trade deficit. In popular discussions
of the failure of US trade to turn around more quickly, a common
theme is that uncertainty has inhibited the adjustment process --
thatboth US and foreign firms have been reluctant to shift
resources, both because they have viewed the strong dollar as
1likely to return, and because in an uncertain environment they
have adopted a general "wait-and-see" attitude. There is now
widespread concern that the sluggish response of trade flows to
the exchange rate, brought about in part because of past exchange
rate volatility, will lead to further future volatility, because
the declining dollar will now have to "overshoot" its long run
level in order to persuade US firms to invest in the
"reindustrialization" that is now needed.
Recent theoretical work in international economics has helped
to provide an analytical basis for these concerns. Baldwin and
Krugman (1987) argued that fixed costs of entering and leaving
markets could lead to "hysteresis" in the trade balance: an
appreciation that induces US firms to exit and foreign firms to
enter markets would require a subsequent depreciation below the
original point to induce them to move back. Dixit (1987a,b)showed
that a volatile exchange rate reinforces the "wait and see"
attitude of firms that must pay a price to enter or exit markets:
in effect, moving resources becomes the exercise of an option,
which adds a sort of shadow fixed cost to resource reallocation.
Krugman (1988) suggests that this response to uncertaintyleads to
a multiplier process of real exchange rate volatility: the more
volatile the exchange race, the less responsive is trade; the
less responsive is trade, the more volatile the exchange rate.
This rapidly emerging literature is highly suggestive of the
importance of thinking about how resources get reallocated in an
uncertain world.
In the theoretical literature to date, however, the problem
2of the simultaneous determination of resource reallocation and
exchange rate behavior has not been formally tackled. Dixit's
analysis simply posits an exchange rate process, without asking
how the behavior of firms might affect this process. Baldwin and
Krugrnan offer a preliminary analysis of joint determination, but
the analysis depends on the highly unsatisfactory assumption of
iid shocks to the capital account. Thus the obvious need is for an
approach that in at least a minimal way links the problem of
reallocating resources to the behavior of the real exchange rate,
and vice versa.
This paper offers an effort to do this. I consider a minimal
model in which a country faces uncertain future capital flows and
in which it is costly to move resources between the tradeable and
nontradeable sectors of the economy. In this model real exchange
rate behavior and the investment behavior of individual agents are
jointly determined. The model is not a complete analysis of the
real exchange rate problem: the process generating capital flows
is simply assumed, not grounded in maximizing behavior.
Nonetheless, the approach makes at least a step toward greater
completeness, and yields highly suggestive results.
There are two main conclusions from the model. The first is
that an economy subject to transitory, uncettain capital movements
will exhibit wider fluctuations in its real exchange rate than the
same economy would need to accommodate sustained, predictable
capital flows of the same magnitude. The reason is the
unwillingness of firms to reallocate resources in the former case:
regarding the real exchange rates associated with capital
3movements as likely to be temporary, they will not shift resources
even when the real exchange rate is sufficiently high or low that
it would appear profitable to do so; and they will also be
inhibited from moving resources by the "option" cost that results
from uncertainty per se. Thus widened movements of the real
exchange rate become necessary in order to accommodate any given
capital movement.
The other main conclusion is that large exchange rate changes
will indeed typically require subsequent "overshooting" in the
opposite direction. The extent of this overshooting will be
greater, the greater the inhibitory effects on reallocation
described above.
The paper is in five parts. The first part sets out the basic
assumptions of the model. The second part describes the analytical
technique used to find equilibrium behavior. The third part
explicitly derives behavior in several special cases for which
closed form solutions can be derived, while the fourth part
discussesthegeneralcase with the aid of numerical
illustrations. A final section considers the implications of the
model and possible directions for future research.
1. Assunrntions of the model
We consider a country that consumes two goods: a nontraded
good and a composite tradeable. Since this model will be concerned
with dynamics and expectations, it will be necessary both to
specify preferences over the two goods at each point in time and
4to specify intertemporal choices. The intertemporal choicewill be
the result of maximizing a utility function of the form
W —f U(C,C )ertdt (1)
oNT
where CN, CT are instantaneous rates of consumption of the
two goods; U(.) is the instantaneous utility function; and r is
the rate of time preference.
The function U(.) will be assumed to take on a very special





The key simplifying assumption here is that utility is linear
in CN. Together with (1), this implies that there will be a
constant real discount rate r in terms of the nontraded good. It
also implies that there will be no income effects in the demand
for the traded good, so that a quasi-partial-equilibrium analysis
becomes possible. The quadratic form of (2) is less important; it
simply insures a linear demand curve for the traded good,which
makes analytical solution of the model easier but does not affect
the fundamental results.
The country can produce both goods. There is a single
resource R that can be used in either sector:
(3)
5In the tradeable sector, we assume that one unit of resource
produces one unit of the good. Consumption of the good is domestic
production plus the trade deficit:
CT_Rl+B
(4)
We want to assume that it is costly to shift resources
between sectors. I will suppose that in order to move one unit of
the resource either into or out of the tradeable sector requires
the use of y units of resource in the nontradeable sector (i.e.,
the "resource-moving" sector -- construction?-- istreated as a
part of the nontraded sector, not as a separate sectorwhich
itself requires costly entry and exit of resources). Thus the
production of nontraded goods for consumption depends on the
resources left over after allowing for any movement of resources
between sectors. Again choosing units so that one unit of the
resource produces one unit of the good, we have
(5)
Up to this point the model is a full intertemporal
optimization setup, albeit with some special assumptions. A key
variable, however, is the trade deficit B. Ideally, we should
model the current account as the consequence of savings and
investment choices, and derive the trade account as the current
account less net interest payments on past investments. For the
purposes of the present model, however, this would be very
6difficult (and in any case the ability of an optimizing approach
to account for exchange rate movements is highly doubtful!).Thus
I take an ad hoc approach instead, one that is intended to make
the linkage between real adjustment and real exchange rate
behavior without getting too deeply into the determinants of the
capital account. The approach is to ignore investment income,
setting the trade balance equal to the negative of the capital
account; and to impose directly more or less plausiblebut
arbitrary behavior on thataccount1. Specifically, the trade
deficit, a.k.a. the capital account, follows a stochastic process
of the form
dE —-pBdt+adz (6)
This may be interpreted as follows. Capital flows fluctuate
randomly, but show a tendency to return to zero, imparting a
cyclic character to the capital account. The parameter p measures
the strength of the tendency for capital flows to end (or
equivalently is an inverse index of the persistence of current
account imbalances). The parameter a is a measure of the
uncertainty of future capital flows. As we will see shortly,the
1Thisway of setting up the problem can be given analternative
interpretation: there is no capital mobility, and B is a random
transfer payment from abroad. In a formal sense this is the
correct description of the model; but I want to think of the model
as yielding insights about behavior under mobile if perhaps
erratic capital as well.
7larger are both p and a, the more reluctant economic agentswill
be to reallocate resources to the sector in which they earn the
higher return.
We have now laid out the basic assumptions of the model. The
next step is to formulate the optimal resource allocation problem.
2. Determinants of resource allocation
For any given allocation of R between the tradeable and
nontradeable sectors, and for any given rate of capital inflow B,
it is straightforward to determine the relative price of tradeable
goods that clears the market. We have
e_ap(RT+B)
(7)
where e is the price of traded relative to nontraded goods, and
will be referred to as the real exchange rate (recognizing that
this is one of a number of possible definitions).
Given the simple production structure of this model, the real
exchange rate is immediately a measure of the relative earnings of
the resource in te two sectors. One unit of resource always earns
one unit of nontradeable per period in the nontradeable sector; it
earns e units in the tradeable sector. If resources could be
costlessly moved between sectors, e would always equal one.
Since resources cannot be moved costlessly, e will in general
not equal one. Resources will only be moved when moving a unit of
resource from one sector to the other increases its value by as
8much as the cost of moving. Thus the main concern of the analysis
must be with the valuation of a unit of resources in place in
either sector -ormore particularly, with the difference in
value of a unit in resource in the traded as opposed to the
nontraded sector.
The key variable is the increase in value that would occur
if a unit of resources were moved from the nontraded to traded
sector. This variable may of course take on negative values,
corresponding to the case where the resource would be worth more
in the nontraded sector. Let us denote this value as V(RT,B); it
is clearly a function of these two variables, which summarize
completely the state of the economy at any point in time.
V(RT,B) may be thought of as the value of akind of asset,
where the asset is the state of having a unit of resources in the
traded rather than the nontraded sector. (The "asset" can take on
negative values, but this poses no problems). The return on this
asset has two parts: the "earnings", measured by the difference
between what the resource earns in tradeables and what it could
earn in nontradeables, and the "capital gains", the expected rate
of increase of the asset's value. Together these returns must add
to an overall rate of return r. Thus we have the condition
rV(RT,B) —(e-l)+E[dV(R,B)/dt] (8)
which may be rearranged to yield the asset-pricing equation
V(RT,)— r(e-l)+rE[dV(RT,B)/dt] (8')
9The role of expectations appears in the form of the expected
change in valuation. For a given RT, the expected change in V,
using the usual rules of stochastic calculus, is
E[dV(R.r,B)/dt] —PBVB
+(a2/2)VBB (9)
What about changes in As long as -< V<-y,there is no
incentive to move resources between sectors. When V would
otherwise exceed -resourceswill move into the tradeable sector
so as to keep V —-y.When V would otherwise be less than --y,
resources will move out of the traded sector so as to keep V —-y.
The analysis of the model, then, requires finding for each
value of RT the function V(RT,B) that satisfies (9) and also is
consistent with the fact that resources will be reallocated when V
reaches its upper or lower limit.
3. Three special cases
We can derive explicit expressions for V(.), and thus
describe real exchange rate behavior, in three special cases.
While these cases are problematic, they help to suggest the final
form of the answer.
Static expectations
The first and simplest case is where p—O and 2_O. That is,
10there is no tendency for capital flows to end and no uncertainty.
This case is problematic, in the sense that if it were literally
true the capital flow would never change; however, it may be
interpreted as the case where capital flows are permanent and
predictableenoughthat firmshaveessentiallystatic
expectations.






The implications of (10) are shown in Figure 1. For each
allocation of resources there is a downward sloping V function in
B,V space. That is, the higher the capital inflow, the lower the
value of having resources in the traded goods sector. The higher
the value of RT, the further to the left this line lies. That is,
when more resources are committed to the traded goods sector, the
capital inflow must be smaller or the capital outflow larger in
order to make the value of keeping them in that sector as great as
before. By bearing in mind that shifts when V hits its upper or
lower bound, and that when it does the economy moves onto a new
V-schedule, we can use Figure 1 to represent the movements of
three variables in two dimensions.
The dynamics of resource reallocation in this special case
may be best understood by considering a thought experiment.
Suppose that the economy is initially at point 1: capital flows
are zero, and the real exchange rate is such that it is not worth
11moving resources either in or out of traded goods production. Now
begin increasing the capital inflow. At first the economy will
simply move down the V-schedule, as indicated by movement from 1
to 2. In other words, a small capital inflow will lead to a real
appreciation (a fall in e) but not to a shift of resources out of
the tradeable sector. If the inflow is large enough to push the
economy past point 2, however, resources will move outof the
tradeable sector; this "deindustrialization" will prevent any
further real appreciation. Specifically, the real exchange rate
cannot appreciate beyond the point where e —1-r-yor depreciate
beyond the point where e —1+r-y.
What a large capital inflow will do, then, is promote a
decrease in RT, shifting the economy to a new V-schedule that lies
to the right --moving,say, from 2 to 3.
Now suppose that the capital inflow were once again to
decline. Then the economy would jretraceits steps. Instead it
would move back along the new V-schedule. A return to current
account balance would involve returning, not to point 1, but to a
point like point 4. At 4 the resources in the tradeable sector are
smaller than they were at 1, and thus the real exchange rate is
lower.
This special case helps illustrate how resource reallocation
both responds to and itself affects the path of the real exchange
rate. However, it omits by assumption any possible effect of
expectations, arising either from an expected decline in temporary
capital inflows or from uncertainty about future flows. As we will
see, it is not possible to derive a closed form solution for the
12general case where both factors are operating. However, useful
insights can be gained by considering the two effects separately.
In examining these separate cases it will be easiest if we
focus on one particular value of RT: namely, that value for which
e —1when B —0,that is, where in the absence of capital flows
the two sectors offer equal returns. The principles involved are
illustrated most easily in this case, and when we want to go
beyond special cases we will have to adopt numerical methods in
any case, which will allow us to handle anylevel of R.
Regressive expectations
For our next special case we allow p >0,while continuing to
assume a2—O. That is, any capital account imbalance is now
regarded as temporary, but the future is regarded as free from





or, given our choice of
V(R.,B) —-r8B-
r1pBVB(RT,B)
To solve this, we make a guess at the form of the function
V(.): suppose that (for this particular value of RT) it takes the
form -AB. Then we have
13-AB —-r8B+r1pAB
implying A —$(r+p)1.So the value function is
V(RT,B) —-flB/(r+p) (11)
To see the implications of this, consider Figure 2. The
lighter line indicates the value function corresponding to the
static expectations case; this function, as we already noted,
intersects the upper and lower bounds at capital flows
corresponding to realexchangerates ofl+r'yand 1-ri
respectively. The heavy line indicates the value function with
p>O. Since is assumed the same in both cases, the real exchange
rate corresponding to any given capital flow is the same. However,
the new V-schedule lies inside the band for a wider range of
capital flows than the old. Thus the real exchange rate can vary
more. The reason is that the movement of resources in or out of
the tradeable sector, which is what limits real exchange rate
variation, is inhibited by the knowledge that capital flows are
only temporary. The maximum capital inflow before resources move
in is -y(r+p)/, corresponding to a real exchange rate of l-(r+p)'y;
similarly, the maximum real exchange rate is l+(r+p).
Uncertainty
Our remaining special case is where p—O --thatis, the
capital account follows a random walk. This case doesn't make much
14economic sense, but once again it can be used to isolate a
particular effect. The lesson from this case is that uncertainty
about capital flows per se acts to inhibit resource reallocation.
Now one might be inclined to think that when capital flows
are perceived as being equally likely to rise orfall from any
starting point there would be no expected changein the real
exchange rate or in the relative value of resourcesin the
tradeable and nontradeble sectors. This is, however, not the case.
The basic intuition is as follows. Suppose that at the current
level of capital inflow V is close to --y --thatis, it is almost
worth shifting resources out of the traded goods sector. Then if B
rises substantially, everyone knows that resources will be
reallocated, preventing V from falling below -y. On the other
hand, if B falls, there is no comparable response on theother
side. Thus when V is close to --i'theexpected rate of change in V
is positive, even if B follows a random walk. Similarly, when V is
close to -i--y,itsexpected rate of change will be negative.
These biases in the expected change in relative valuation
will have the effect of flattening out the relationship between B
and V, "dragging" V below the static expectations locus when B is
low, above it when B is high. The general shape is illustrated in
Figure 3: a backwards S that lies below the line V —-B/rin the
upper part of the band between -i and --y,above it in the lower
part.
Given the particular functional forms assumed in this model,
it is in fact possible to derive a closed-form solution for the
curve in Figure 3. Again focussing on the particular value of
15where e —1when B —0,we can write the value function as
V(RT,B) —-B/r+(a2/2r)VBB(RT,B)
(12)
A functional form that works in thiscase2 is
V(RT,B) —-flB/r+p(e
-e] (13)
where both A andneed to be determined.








But this must be true for all values of B, which can only be true
if
—(2r/a2)1'2 (16)
To determine p we first note that in order to get the general
shape illustrated in Figure 3, we must have p<O. The specific
function is chosen to be symmetric around B —0,as we would
expect for the particular value of chosen. More generally, the
form is [a (RTfB) -lJ/r +p1e
+
16value of j.isdetermined by the requirement that the curve be
precisely tangent to the edges of the band, i.e., reach a maximum
at -yanda minimum at --y.Thisis the "smooth pasting" condition
of option-pricing theory, which has recently been shown to play a
role in a wide variety of problems of behavior under uncertainty
(see Krugman 1987 for an application to target zone exchange rate
regimes, Dixit 1987a for an application to entry and exit under
fluctuating exchange rates, and Duxnas 1988 for an application to
international investment). The parallel with option pricing should
not be surprising: agents, in valuing resources in this model,
know that they have the future option of moving the resources to
the other sector; their decision to do so is therefore like
exercising an option, and the optimal allocation problem has
associated with it a value function that looks a lot like an
option pricing problem.
The important point in terms of the economics is that the
effect of uncertainty in this case is to inhibit resource
movements and thus widen the range of possible real exchange rate
variation. This may be seen clearly from Figure 3, where the
V-function is flatter than the static-expectations locus and thus
intersects the edges of the band at higher and lower values of B
than in the static-expectations case; the result will therefore be
that the real exchange rate can move to levels that would have
been impossible, ruled outby the possibilityof
deindustrialization or reindustrialization, if there were no
uncertainty. That is, uncertainty generates a "wait-and-see"
attitude that discourages movement of resources between sectors.
17An alternative way to think about this is to push the option
analogy: moving resources is like exercising an option. In the
face of volatility, options will not be exercised as soon as they
are in the money, that is, as soon as the market price exceeds the
contract price. Instead, it is optimal to hold out for a higher
price, with the optimal exercise price increasing in volatility.
Similarly, uncertainty makes agents reluctant to move resources,
with their reluctance an increasing function of volatility.
We have now shown two reasons why an unstable pattern of
capital flows may lead to wider real exchange rate fluctuations
than would be produced by persistent, predictable capital flows of
the same magnitude. To the extent that capital flows are perceived
as temporary, firms are reluctant to reallocate resources; even
if the capital flows do not show a tendency to revert to the mean,
the "option" cost of reallocatingresources inhibits
deindustrialization and reindustrialization. Our next step is to
combine these two motives and examine the behavior of the general
model.
4. flgeneralcase and real exchange rate dynamics
The general equation for the value function given the





This has no closed-form solution, but it can be solved
18numerically. The general shape will be the same as that
illustrated in Figure 3; that is, for each value of there will
be a backwards-S that is tangent to the edges of the band defined
by the maximum and minimum values of V. We can denote the maximum
and minimum values of B for any given IL as B(IL) and B (R._).
I max I mm J.
The numerical solution procedure is a "shooting" technique3.
We make a guess at Bi(RT). We know that at that point V —yand
VB —0,which allows us to infer VBB from (17). Once we have
estimated VB and VBB at one point, we can then compute V and VB
for a slightly higher value of B, find the value of VBB necessary
to justify this V, and repeat. This allows computation of the
value function passing through our initial guess. We then search
over starting values of B .(IL)until we find one for which the
mm I
minimum value of V is -y -- thatis, where the function is tangent
to the bottom as well as the top of the band.
Figure 4 shows the value function computed for the
parameters shown in Table 1, as well as the static expectations
locus. The value of R.,., chosen is that for which e—l when B—O, that
is, resources earn the same return in the two sectors when trade
is balanced. The values of -y and r imply that in a static
expectations world the maximum and minimum values of e would be
1.05 and -0.95, that is, a five percent shift in the exchange rate
would be enough to induce resources to move. However, p—O.2 --
capitalflows are viewed as transitory, with a mean persistence of
five years; and substantial volatility is also introduced.
3This technique was suggested by the analysis of target zones in
Miller and Weller (1988).
19The consequence of the combination of expected mean-reversion
and uncertainty is a drastic widening of the range of potential
real exchange rate variation. The "range of no change", the range
of capital flows for which resources will not be reallocated, is
almost 5 times as large as in the static expectations case. Thus
the range of potential real exchange rate variation is also five
times as large, that is, plus or minus 24.8 percent.
We can also now consider the general dynamics of the real
exchange rate. The V-schedule in Figure 4 is one of a family of
such curves, each corresponding to a different value of R,, as
illustrated in Figure 5. As B fluctuates, it moves the economy up
or down a particular curve until V hits -y or --y. Then the economy
shifts resources into or out of the traded goods sector, so that
we move along the edge of the band. Then when B reverses direction
the economy moves back along the backwards-S that is tangent to
the band at the highest or lowest B reached.
A typical exchange rate cycle might involve the path
illustrated as 1234 in the figure. Starting from an equilibrium in
the middle of the band, rising capital inflows would at first lead
to real appreciation but not to resource reallocation. When point
2 is passed, however, the economy will begin to shift resources
out of tradeables; the real exchange rate at which this takes
place is considerably below that at which such a shift would have
taken place if the capital flows were regarded as permanent. The
further rise in B to point 3 produces no further real
appreciation, only more reallocation. If B now begins to fall, the
economy moves back along the V-schedule that is tangent to the
20band at 3, and thus returns to 4, not to 1; since RT is lower at
the end of this cycle than at the beginning, the real exchange
rate is higher. Looking at the path of e over time, we get the
results illustrated in Figure 6. The broken lines show the maximum
and minimum values of e in a static expectations world; the figure
shows both that the range of real exchange variation is wider in
an uncertain world and that a large exchange rate movement that
leads to deindustrialization must be offset by a subsequent
overshooting in the opposite direction.
5. Implications
This paper has offered a simple model that appears to
confirm recent intuitions about real exchange rate behavior.
Perceptions that capital flows are temporary and/or uncertain
discourage reallocation of resources even when the real exchange
rate produces large differences in returns between tradeable and
nontradeable sectors, and this reluctance to shift resources
in turn widens the fluctuations of the real exchange rate.
An interesting corollary of the analysis is that economic
policy can shift the trade balance by influencing beliefs about
the process generating capital flows as well as by changing the
current real exchange rate. Currently officials at the IMF and
other organizations concerned about the US trade deficit argue
that the US trade deficit will fall if only firms can be convinced
that in future the dollar will remain stable at its current level
--thatis, if their caution over the possibility of a rebound can
21be cured. This is the kind of idea that makes sense in this model.
Of course, the IMF would then follow this with the assertion
that stable macroeconomic policies plus targets for nominal
exchange rates can in fact alter the process generating capital
flows in a desirable way. This assertion cannot be tested in this
model, since capital flows were treated as exogenous. This points
to the clear next step in this modelling effort, the integration
of real models like this one with the monetary factors that most
economists believe underlie exchange rate fluctuations in
practice.
Thus this paper is not the last word on its subject, by a
long shot. However, I hope that it does make convincingly the case
that to understand exchange rate dynamics we must also address the
dynamics of resource reallocation.
REFERENCES
Baldwin, R. and P. Krugman (1986):"Persistent trade effects of
large exchange rate shocks", NBER Working Paper.
Dixit, A. (l987a): "Entry and exit decisions of firms under
fluctuating exchange rates"; mimeo, Princeton University.
Dixit, A. (1987b): "Hysteresis, import penetration, and exchange
rate pass-through", mimeo, Princeton University
Dumas, 8.(1988): "Pricing physical assets internationally",
mimeo, Wharton.
22Krugman, P. (1987): "Trigger strategies and price dynauiics in
equity and foreign exchange markets", NZER Working Paper #2459.
Krugman, P.(1988): Exchang Rate Instability, The Robbins
Memorial Lectures, MIT Press, forthcoming.
Miller, M. and P. Weller (1988): Target zones, currency options,
and the dollar", mimeo, University of Warwick.









— — — — — — — — —
— — — S — — — — SFigure 3
V
13





























































S — S S S — S S